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Drawn into Violence: Evidence on ‘What Makes a Criminal’ 
from the Vietnam Draft Lotteries
* 
 
Draft lottery number assignment during the Vietnam era provides a natural experiment to 
examine the effects of military service on crime. Using exact dates of birth for inmates in 
state and federal prisons in 1979, 1986, and 1991, we find robust evidence of effects on 
violent crimes among whites. In particular, we find that draft eligibility increases incarceration 
rates for violent crimes by 14 to 19 percent. Based on Angrist and Chen’s (2008) estimate of 
the effect of draft eligibility on veteran status, these estimates imply that military service 
increases the probability of incarceration for a violent crime by 0.27 percentage points. 
Results for nonwhites are not robust. We conduct two falsification tests, one that applies 
each of the three binding lotteries to unaffected cohorts and another that considers the 
effects of lotteries that were not used to draft servicemen. 
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\CRIMINALS ARE MADE, NOT BORN." |Stenciled sign left behind by Michi-
gan school board member and suicidal mass murderer Andrew Kehoe after killing
45 people, mostly school children.
Understanding the extent to which criminals are \made" and, further, identifying the
determinants of criminal behavior is of utmost importance to any society that wants to reduce
crime. To date, most research in this area has focused on the eects of individuals' immediate
environments. For example, researchers have considered the causal eects of punishments
for infractions (Levitt 1998), policing (Levitt 1997; Levitt 2002; McCrary 2002; Lee and
McCrary 2009), the ability to drink legally (Carpenter 2007; Carpenter and Dobkin 2008),
neighborhoods (Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirscheld 2001; Kling, Ludwig, and Katz 2004), gun
shows (Duggan, Hamjalmarrson, and Jacob 2007), sports losses (Rees and Schnepel 2009;
Card and Dahl 2009), and incapacitation (Jacob and Lefgren 2003; Dahl and DellaVigna
2009). Studies that explore how individuals' backgrounds aect criminal behavior are rarer
with Lochner and Moretti's (2004) research on the eect of education providing a notable
exception.1 In this paper, we add to this literature by exploiting the randomness of the
national Vietnam draft lotteries to examine the eects of military service on subsequent
incarceration.
Our study also speaks to the costs of military engagements. It is widely acknowledged
that costs can continue to accrue long after a conict ends, as military service can lead
to posttraumatic stress disorder and other long-term health problems. This paper, which
analyzes impacts on crime, can be thought of as exploring another such long-term cost, which
is important for comprehensive cost-benet considerations.
While we consider the impacts of military service on multiple types of crimes, our pri-
1Though subsequent re-analysis by Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2008) has questioned the strength of
the rst stage when using compulsory schooling laws as an instrument for educational attainment.
2mary focus is on violent crimes. Notably, the Vietnam era coincided with an important
shift in military training motivated by S.L.A. Marshall's pioneering research documenting
extremely low ring rates for soldiers serving in World War II. In order to overcome soldiers
reluctance to re at enemy combatants, beginning in the late-1960s, the military began mak-
ing conscious eorts to provide more realistic training scenarios (Grossman 2009).2 While
this desensitization to engaging in violence may be crucial to survival in a combat zone,
it is easy to see how it might lead to problems after a soldier returns to civilian life.3 Of
course, there are several other possible mechanisms through which military service might
aect crime. For example, military service might increase crime due to its association with
posttraumatic stress disorder, because it precludes labor market experience thus reducing
wages (Angrist 1990; Abadie (2002); Angrist and Chen 2008), or because of possible eects
on opiate use (Robins, Davis, and Goodwin 1974). On the other hand, the discipline in-
volved with military training might make individuals less likely to commit crimes. Further,
military service could reduce criminality via an incapacitation eect, as individuals are in
the military environment at the ages at which they are at highest risk of incarceration.
A sizable literature links military service to criminal behavior, particularly to violent
behavior, but much of the prior work lacks plausibly exogenous variation and focuses on
small non-random samples.4 Exogenous variation in military service is crucial since men who
2For example, using silhouettes in place of bulls eye targets. Slone and Friedman (2008) describe modern
training as preparing soldiers \to react within a split-second of any provocative activity and [to shut down]
emotions."
3In a similar fashion, this training may in part be responsible for some of the violent conicts amongst
fellow servicemen. In Another Brother, Greg Payton describes one such conict:
We had been brought to Vietnam for violence, for violent purposes, so it wasn't unusual for
us to be violent amongst ourselves you know. I remember the rst time I got shot at it was
Christmas Eve and an African American GI had a ght with a white GI. The white GI went
back to his hooch and he got his weapon. We heard a weapon being loaded. Instinctively we
hit the ground and he opened up automatic re. It was just by split seconds that we weren't
all killed.
4For example, Yager (1976) shows that veterans are more violent, Yesavage (1984) and Resnick et al.
(1989) show that combat veterans are more violent, and Yager, Laufer, and Gallops (1984) show that
combat exposure is correlated with criminal convictions. Bouard (2003) is an exception in this literature,
3are more likely to engage in criminal activities may be the most likely to enlist. A few recent
papers have made serious attempts to address this type of non-random selection. Galiani,
Rossi and Schargrodsky (2009) use variation driven by Argentina's draft lottery, nding that
conscription during the Falklands War increased crime rates. Looking in the U.S. context,
Rohlfs (2010) examines one of the several possible mechanisms through which military service
might aect crime, using cohort-level variation in combat deaths during the Vietnam War
as an instrument for combat experience. This study nds evidence that combat exposure
increases self-reported violent acts among blacks but imprecise eects among whites. Rohlfs
(2006) is the only prior study using plausibly exogenous variation to consider the eects of
military service on crime in the U.S. This study compares the fraction of Vietnam-era draft
eligible inmates in prison to the fraction expected based on cohorts not subjected to the
drafts, and nds weak evidence of eects on crime.5
In this paper, we also focus on variation provided by the Vietnam draft lotteries. In
particular, our identifying variation is driven by: (1) the Vietnam era draft lotteries which
randomly assigned lottery numbers to exact dates of birth and (2) the fact that the military
drafted men with the lowest lottery numbers for potential induction until manpower require-
ments were met each year. As such, we are able to determine the extent to which military
service aects criminal behavior by comparing the incarceration rates (based on the number
births) for those whose lottery numbers were called to report for induction into the military
to the incarceration rates those whose numbers were not called. We do this by combining
nding no evidence of an impact on violent crime after controlling for criminal behavior prior to Vietnam.
5Our study oers several advantages over this pioneering study. First, instead of using a cross-cohort dif-
ferences and dierences framework we focus solely on within cohort variation provided by the draft lotteries.
Thus, we are able to use non-aected cohorts as a robustness check to verify that our results are not driven by
the particular sets of birthdays selected in the drafts. Second, our outcome variable lends itself to a natural
interpretation. Specically, it provides a direct estimate of the eect of draft eligibility on the probability
of incarceration in the survey years. Third, we explore longer-run eects and enhance the precision of our
estimates by expanding the sample to include inmates incarcerated in 1986 and 1991 in addition to those
incarcerated in 1979. Finally, we present a comprehensive exploration of the eects of draft eligibility on
crime by separately considering its eects on violent crime, drug-related crime, and property-related crime,
and public order crime.
4data from the 1979, 1986, and 1991 Surveys of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional
Facilities (SISFC) with data from the Vital Statistics of the United States to create measures
of incarceration rates for each day of birth for the cohorts aected by the draft lotteries.
While random assignment allows us to cleanly identify the eects of draft eligibility, our
data do not allow us to directly estimate the eect of military service on crime since we
only have data on the population of inmates. In particular, these data do not allow us
to estimate the rst-stage eect of draft eligibility on military service. As such, we use
Angrist and Chen's (2008) rst-stage estimates to obtain two sample instrumental variables
estimates of the eect of military service on incarceration. A caveat to this exercise is that
draft eligibility may aect crime through mechanisms besides its impact on military service.
For example, Angrist and Krueger (1992) and Card and Lemieux (2001) nd positive eects
of eligibility on education. This phenomenon, however, will reduce the likelihood that we
nd positive eects on crime. At least two other possibilities make it less likely that we are
able to identify an eect on crime. First, veterans may be less likely to be observed in prison
due increased mortality rates. Second, veterans may be granted leniency by judges, juries,
and/or law enforcement ocers.6 While \negative" draft avoidance behaviors may bias us
towards nding eects on crime, we present evidence based on the non-binding 1953{1956
lotteries that suggests this is unlikely.
We nd weak evidence of impacts on overall incarceration rates among whites but nd
robust evidence of impacts on incarceration rates for violent crimes. In particular, we nd
that draft eligibility increases incarceration rates for violent crimes by 14 to 19 percent across
the three survey years. Based on Angrist and Chen's (2008) estimate of the eect of eligibility
on veteran status, these estimates imply that being a veteran increases the probability of
being incarcerated for a violent crime by 0.27 percentage points for whites. We nd similar
6We return to this issue in the conclusion where we discuss special courts that have been set up to try
oenders who are veterans.
5results when separately considering the eects by birth cohort and by survey year. The
results for nonwhites are less robust and relatively imprecise, with standard error estimates
usually seven times greater than similar estimates for whites.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the
Vietnam era draft lotteries. Sections 3 and 4 describe our data and empirical strategy.
Section 5 discusses the tradeos involved in choosing the analysis sample. Section 6 presents
our results and robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 discusses our results and concludes.
2 Background on the Draft Lotteries
To fairly allocate military service in Vietnam, a total of seven lottery drawings were held to
determine who would serve, although conscription was halted after the third lottery. The
three lotteries used to draft servicemen were held in 1969, 1970, and 1971. While the 1969
lottery applied to those born 1944{1950, each subsequent drawing applied only to men who
turned 18 in the year of the lottery. In particular, the 1970 lottery applied to those born in
1951 and the 1971 lottery applied to those born in 1952.
In each drawing, the birthdays of the year were randomly assigned a Random Sequence
Number (RSN). In the 1969 drawing September 1st was assigned RSN 1 so men born on
September 1st were asked to report to their local draft boards for potential induction before
men born on other days. April 24th was assigned RSN 2 so men born on that day were asked
to report second, and so forth. The military continued to call men for potential induction in
order of RSN until the manpower requirements were met for that year. The last RSN called
for service, also known as the highest Administrative Processing Number (APN), was 195
for the 1969 drawing, 125 for the 1970 drawing, and 95 for the 1971 drawing. Throughout
the paper, we refer to indivduals with RSNs less than the APN as \draft eligible."
While the issue was addressed for later drawings, there was an important mechanical
6problem with the randomization mechanism used in the 1969 drawing. In particular, each
birthday was coded onto a capsule and these capsules were added month by month into a
drawer, with the drawer being \shued" after each month. As a result of incomplete mixing,
dates later in the year remained on top of the pile and were more likely to be drawn rst and
called rst for induction (Fienberg 1971). This phenomenon is shown in Figure A1 in the
appendix, which plots the number of draft eligible days by month for each lottery. To the
extent that people born in later months might be more or less likely to commit crimes, this
could lead to omitted variable bias. We follow the previous literature (Angrist and Chen
2008, Conley and Heerwing 2009, Eisenberg and Rowe 2009, Angrist, Chen, and Frandsen
2010) to address this potential issue by controlling for year by month of birth xed eects
in our analysis.7
For multiple reasons, military service is not perfectly predicted by being born on a draft-
eligible day. Men born on non-eligible birthdays could volunteer and men born on drafted
days could fail the medical exams, refuse to report, or apply for various exemptions. Despite
these issues, the draft had a signicant eect on military service, the magnitude of which is
discussed in Section 6.1.
3 Data Description and Construction
Our data on incarceration come from the 1979, 1986, and 1991 Surveys of Inmates in State
and Federal Correctional Facilities (SISFC), which are representative of the prison population
in state and federal correctional facilities.8 These data contain information on the prisoner's
exact date of birth, race, sex, and the type of oense for which he was incarcerated. The
7Information on the details of the Vietnam Draft lottery can be found at the Selective Service Website
http://www.sss.gov/lotter1.htm and in Flynn (1993) and Baskir and Strauss (1978).
8Unfortunately, these years of data do not allow us to document the extent to which military service has
an incapacitation eect, which could potentially be manifested in reduced incarceration rates in the early
1970s when the draftees were serving in the military.
7type of oense is classied according to approximately 80 oense codes and each inmate is
associated with up to four dierent oense codes (since inmates can concurrently serve time
for multiple oenses).
We conduct the analysis separately for whites and nonwhites at the date of birth by
survey year level. Each observation represents a collapsed cell measuring the incarceration
rate (per 10,000 births) in survey year s for individuals born on day d. To construct this
variable, we divide the number of male convicts we observe in prison in survey year s with
date of birth d by the number of males that were born in the United States on day d:




The denominator for equation above comes from the Vital Statistics of the United States
(VSUS). Since the VSUS only reports births by month prior to 1969, we must construct the
number of births for each given day. We report results in which the number of births in each
month are apportioned evenly across the days in the month. The results are nearly identical
using strategies for constructing the denominator that adjust for diering birth patterns
observed on weekdays versus weekends. These robustness checks are described further in the
appendix.
To properly link each birthday with a particular draft lottery number we use the draft
lottery information available from the Selective Service System. This allows us to associate
each birth date with a lottery number for each of the lotteries.
84 Empirical Strategy
If military service were purely random, we could use our data to analyze the eect of military
service on incarceration rates by estimating
IncarcerationRatesd =   FractionV eteransd + usd; (2)
where IncarcerationRatesd is the incarceration rate for individuals born on day d in survey
year s and FractionV eteransd is the fraction of veterans among those who were born on day
d. Because selection into the military is not random, this approach would likely lead to biased
estimates of . Perhaps of greatest concern is the possibility that aggressive individuals are
more likely to serve in the military and also to commit crimes, in which case the eect of
being a veteran, , would be would be biased upwards. Alternatively, if individuals with
more respect for authority are more likely to become veterans and less likely to commit
crimes then  will be biased downwards. We overcome these obstacles by utilizing variation
driven by the Vietnam draft lotteries. Given the random assignment of draft eligibility by
date of birth, we instead estimate
IncarcerationRatesd =   DraftEligibled + sd (3)
where  estimates the average reduced form eect of draft eligibility on incarceration rates.
Due to the mechanical issues associated with the draft lotteries described above and because
the data span multiple survey years, we also include year by month of birth xed eects and
survey year xed eects.9
To recover the estimated eect of military service on incarceration rates, we need to know
9While it might appear desirable to control for other covariates, Angrist (1989) suggests that this is not
necessary since there is no correlation between draft lottery status and characteristics besides subsequent
veteran status.
9the eect of draft eligibility on military service which can be estimated by
FractionV eteransd =   DraftEligibled + !d; (4)
where DraftEligibled is an indicator variable that equals one if men born on date d are
assigned a lottery number that makes them eligible to be drafted into the military and zero
otherwise. However, our data is based on a population of inmates and not from the entire
population subjected to the draft lotteries so we are unable to estimate equation 4. Instead,
we use Angrist and Chen's (2008) estimates of  to calculate two-sample instrumental vari-
able estimates of the eect of military service on incarceration rates. We obtain the TSIV





and estimate the standard error using the delta method.10
While random assignment ensures that ^  will be unbiased, the instrumental variables
estimation strategy relies on the assumption that veteran status is the only mechanism of
transmission between draft eligibility and incarceration rates. We acknowledge that ^  will
be biased if draft eligibility also aects incarceration rates through other mechanisms. It
has been documented that men with low lottery numbers enrolled in college or prolonged
their time in college to avoid military service (Angrist and Krueger 1992). To the extent
that increased education levels lead to decreased crime (Lochner and Moretti 2004) the extra
education conferred by holding a low draft lottery number should bias our estimates of 
downward. Another important consideration is that military service might make men more
likely to die either in combat or afterward.11 This potential bias also works against us nding





^ 4 . Bootstrapping
produces nearly identical standard error estimates.
11As mentioned previously, the literature has not rmly established whether higher mortality eects for
10a positive eect. Finally, the fact that our data exclude those serving in military prisons may
also cause us to understate the eect of military service on criminal behavior. We should also
note that this instrumental variable approach identies the local average treatment eect
(LATE), or the eect of military service on those individuals who can be compelled to enter
the military by the draft lotteries.
5 Tradeos In the Choice of Analysis Sample
The 1979, 1986, and 1991 waves of the SISFCF used in this analysis contain information
on 6642, 6612, and 6631 male inmates subjected to the drafts, respectively. In selecting
an appropriate sample to analyze, there is a tradeo between ease of interpretation of the
results and sample size. The easiest results to interpret are those where data are limited to a
single survey wave. For example, if we limit the sample to cells collapsed from the 1979 data,
the estimates will provide the estimated eect of military service on the probability of being
incarcerated seven to nine years after conscription. The interpretation is more complicated
when we expand the sample to include all three survey waves, where we are estimating a
combination of the probabilities of being observed in prison 7{9, 14{16, and 19{21 years
later. On the other hand, limiting results to a single survey usually leads to large standard
errors since the estimates are based on a smaller sample of inmates.
Combining observations from all three surveys maximizes the coverage over lottery num-
bers. The benet of this approach is perhaps most evident when one considers that 65% of
the 1097 lottery numbers have nonzero observations when using data from all three waves
but only about 38% are nonzero when the lottery number cells are constructed from a sin-
gle survey year.12 Our preferred specication uses all survey waves together to maximize
draft eligible men exist. Eorts to identify health eects among survivors using variation from the draft
lotteries have been also been inconclusive (Dobkin and Shabani 2009).
12For violent nonwhite oenders, the percentages are 74% and 46%, respectively. We should also note that
the rst and third drawings included a 366th number to allow for leap day. In our estimates we discard the
11precision but we also estimate the eects separately using data from each wave.
A similar tradeo involves which birth cohorts to use in the analysis. For men born 1944{
1949, the 1969 drawing was not the rst time they could have been drafted. Prior drafts
were conducted by local draft boards in which each board had some discretion about who
was drafted rst or qualied for deferments (Baskir and Strauss 1978).13 Further, many men
had volunteered before the draft was held. As a result, the 1969 draft had a smaller impact
on military service for men born 1944{1947 relative to those born 1948{1949 for whom the
eect was, in turn, smaller than the eects on those born after 1950 (Angrist and Chen
2008). For this reason, our data may have insucient power to identify eect on crimes for
the earliest cohorts.14 On the other hand, restricting the sample to cohorts that faced the
draft for the rst time in 1979 and later severely reduces the sample size. Because of these
considerations we separately present results pooling all of the cohorts, in addition to showing
estimates for the 1948{1952 and 1950{1952 cohorts who are more-commonly focused on in
the literature.
6 Results
This section is organized into multiple parts. We begin by presenting the rst stage eect of
draft eligibility on military service and then show summary statistics for incarceration rates.
We then estimate eects of draft eligibility and military service on incarceration. Finally, we
perform robustness checks to verify that our main results are not driven by the particular
birthdays that were drawn in any given lottery or by avoidance behaviors among eligible
men.
leap day from the 1969 drawing since it is not as precisely estimated as the other 365 days in that drawing.
13There were approximately 4,000 local draft boards.
14Another potential drawback of including pre-1950 cohorts in the analysis is that the estimated eects
will be partially identied by men who had successfully avoided previous drafts. To the extent that these
individuals may dier from the general population, this may limit the external validity of these estimates.
126.1 First Stage Eect of Eligibility on Military Service
As we described above, the relevant estimate of the eect of the Vietnam draft lotteries on
military service must be based on the entire set of individuals exposed to the draft. Since
our data is limited to the prison population, we use rst stage estimates from Angrist and
Chen (2008). Their rst stage estimates, from restricted-use U.S. Census data, are presented
in Table 1.15
On average, draft eligibility increased the probability of military service by approximately
11 percentage points for whites born 1948{1952. The eect is 2{5 percentage points higher for
the latter three cohorts who were only eighteen when they were subjected to their respective
drafts. In addition, the rst stage is approximately 50 percent greater for whites than
nonwhites. For this reason, we follow Angrist, Chen and Frandsen (2010) and henceforth
focus on results for whites until Section 6.5.
6.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2 presents mean incarceration rates by eligibility status, pooling observations from all
drafted cohorts and all survey years. The table separately considers incarceration rates for
all crimes, violent crimes, drug-related crimes, property crimes, and public order crimes.16
These categories are mutually exclusive, but since an inmate can be concurrently serving
time for multiple oenses, he may appear on multiple lines in the table.
In most cases, the means in Table 2 suggest that induction had only a small eect,
if any, on criminality for whites. On the other hand, the means suggest that induction
15Angrist and Chen (2008) also explore a specication in which the eects are interacted with groups of
lottery numbers. They nd that these additional instruments do not increase precision. For this reason, we
focus on the single instrument case which simplies statistical inference for the TSIV estimates.
16We follow the National Prisoner Statistics oense code categorization. Violent crimes include any at-
tempt at murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, robbery, assault, or extortion. Drug-related crimes in-
clude trac in or possession of drugs. Property crimes include robbery, extortion, burglary, auto theft,
fraud, larceny, embezzlement, any stolen property crime, and drug tracking. Finally, public order crimes
are more varied but primarily consist of weapons violations and serious trac oenses.
13increased incarceration for violent crimes by approximately 13 percent. Figure 1 shows the
mean incarceration rates for three dierent groups of cohorts. First, it shows incarceration
rates for all of the cohorts subjected to the binding drafts, those born 1944{1952. It then
shows the incarceration rates for the 1948{1952 cohorts, for whom we know the impact of
the draft on veteran status was greater. Finally, the gure shows incarceration rates for
men in the 1950{1952 cohorts|the impact of the lottery on military service was greatest
these men who were 18 at the time of the draft lottery and the. In Panel A, there is only
evidence of an impact on overall incarceration rates only for the 1950{1952 cohorts. Panel
B, focusing on incarceration rates solely for violent crimes, tells a dierent story. Here we see
that draft eligibility is associated with higher incarceration rates for violent crimes for each
of the three groups of cohorts. Again, the dierence is most prominent for the 1950-1952
cohorts for whom the lottery had the greatest impact on military service. The next section
will estimate these eects in a regression framework that allows us to conduct statistical
inference.
6.3 Regression Based Estimates Using All Available Data
Table 3 reports the estimated reduced-form eects of draft eligibility on overall incarceration
rates in 1979, 1986, and 1991 among whites. The data are aggregated at the exact date of
birth by survey year level. The estimates control for month by year of birth xed eects to
deal with the fact later birth months had a higher probability of being drawn in the 1969
draft due to mechanical problems. The estimates also control for survey year xed eects.
Echoing the results presented in the previous section, we do not nd evidence that eli-
gibility increased overall incarceration rates for whites who were older than 18 when their
draft lottery was held. The point estimate for the 1950{1952 cohorts, however, indicates a
7.7 percent increase in incarceration rates although this eect is not statistically signicant
at conventional levels.
14Below the estimated percent impact, Table 3 shows estimated eects of military service
on the probability of incarceration. These two-sample instrumental variables estimates use
the rst stage estimates shown in Table 1.17 As we discussed above, while these calculations
rely on the assumption that draft eligibility only aects criminality through its impact on
veteran status, the most likely violations work against us nding an eect. Although the
point estimate suggests that military service increased the probability of incarceration by
0.32 percentage points for whites born 1950{1952, we cannot reject zero at conventional
condence levels.
Table 4 presents similar results but focuses on incarceration rates only for violent crimes.
These results indicate that eligibility led to signicant increases in incarceration rates for
violent crimes for whites. The point estimates indicate that draft eligibility increased in-
carceration rates by 2.6 per 10,000, corresponding to an increase of 13.5 percent. We again
nd more dramatic eects for the later cohorts. For these cohorts, our point estimates
imply that draft eligibility increases rates of incarceration for violent crimes by 19.1 per-
cent. Correspondingly, these results suggest that military service increases the probability
of incarceration for a violent crime by 0.28 percentage points.
Table 5 explores eects on incarceration for drug-related crimes, property crimes, and
public order crimes. The results are never statistically signicant and have no consistent
sign, which sheds light on why we tend to not nd eects of draft eligibility on overall
incarceration rates.18 It is also important to note that, although these results are never
statistically signicant, we cannot rule out relatively large eects. Further, we can reject
that the estimated eects on overall crime, violent crime, drug crime, property crime, and
public order crime are jointly zero (p-value = 0.0141).
17Note that we can only calculate this estimate for the cohorts analyzed by Angrist and Chen (2008).
18Hearst et al. (1991) also uses variation from the Vietnam draft lotteries and nds no evidence that
military service leads to increased drug use.
156.4 Results Stratied by Cohort and Survey Wave
The preceding section presented our preferred estimates since they maximized eciency
by pooling data from all cohorts subjected to the drafts and data from all survey waves.
However, we acknowledge that doing so comes at the cost of interpretability and the risk of
masking heterogeneity. This section presents results that are estimated separately for each
of the cohorts subjected to the draft when they were eighteen years old and for each survey
year for which we have data on inmates. While we focus on incarceration rates for violent
crimes in the discussion below, estimated eects for overall incarceration rates for whites are
shown in the appendix.
Columns 1 through 5 of Table 6 show the estimated eects on incarceration rates for
violent crimes by draft cohort for whites. Although the standard errors are never small
enough to reject zero when any single cohort is considered, the point estimates are fairly
robust across dierent cohorts, indicating that military service increases the probability of
incarceration for a violent crime by 0.15 to 0.39 percentage points.
Columns 6 through 8 of Table 6 separately consider the eects of military service using
inmates in prison in 1979, 1986, and 1991. The men conscripted by the lotteries would have
nished their mandatory service ve to seven years before the 1979 survey was conducted.
Again, the estimates are fairly robust. The estimated eect in 1979 is statistically signicant
at the ve percent level, indicating that military service increases the probability of incar-
ceration for a violent crime by 0.34 percentage points.19 The estimates are similar for 1986
and 1991 although the standard error estimates are larger.
19The estimated eects on overall incarceration in 1979, shown in the appendix, are not statistically
distinguishable from correlational evidence based on the 1980 Census which suggests a small but signicant
negative eect of service in Vietnam on being observed in a correctional facility.
166.5 Estimated Eects for Nonwhites
Table 7 summarizes the estimated eects of draft eligibility and military service on incar-
ceration among nonwhites. As we alluded to earlier, the rst stage is much smaller for
nonwhites.20 In addition, the reduced-form and two-sample IV estimates have standard er-
ror estimates approximately seven times larger than those for whites and the point estimates
are less robust.21
While the estimate based on all of the data provides suggestive evidence of an eect on
violent crime (signicant at the ten-percent level), estimates based on individual cohorts
and individual survey years highlight a lack of robustness. The estimated eects vary sub-
stantially across both cohorts and survey years and are often negative or close to zero. The
biggest outlier is the estimated eect on incarceration in 1991 which suggests that eects
may have manifested for nonwhites in the late 1980s. While this estimate may very well be
a statistical anomaly, it might be related to increases in poverty among veterans during the
1980s or the crack epidemic and its accompanying rise in the incarceration rates of black
males (Chaiken 2000).22 Further research utilizing alternative data sets and/or empirical
strategies will be necessary to further pin down this issue. Towards this end, we have also
20Angrist (1991) sheds light on this issue. Whites were relatively likely to avoid military service unless
drafted which produces a relatively-strong relationship between draft status and eventual military service.
However, because the military was a more attractive option for blacks, they were more likely to have al-
ready signed up for the military by the time the draft lottery was implemented, yielding a relatively-weak
relationship between draft eligibility and veteran service.
21While we could pool whites and nonwhites together, there are several possible reasons to expect hetero-
geneity across race. For example, whites were at lower risk of dying in combat until late in the war (Rohlfs
2010), whites enrolled in college at higher rates to avoid conscription (Rohlfs 2006, Kuziemko 2008) and
whites had higher take-up rates of GI Bill benets after completion of service (Turner and Bound 2003).
22Data from the Current Population Survey reveals that extreme poverty rates rose steadily for Vietnam
veterans during the 1980s while it fell for non-veterans from the same cohorts. These results are available
upon request. While we have examined eects of military service on drug-related crimes for nonwhites in
1991 and found small negative eects, the standard errors are such that the 95 percent condence interval
includes eects as large 21 percent. In addition, statistically insignicant point estimates suggest that draft
eligibility is associated with 153 percent (2.3 per 10,000) more nonwhite incarcerations for crimes involving
both violence and drugs in 1991 versus -17.8 percent and 14.8 percent for 1979 and 1986, respectively. These
results are also available upon request. Also consistent with these results, Fryer et al. (2006) study this
period and conclude that \the greatest social costs of crack have been associated with prohibition-related
violence, rather than drug use per se."
17investigated data from the National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP) which collects
data on the universe of individuals placed into prisons to try to corroborate these ndings.
While the point estimates suggest that draft eligibility is associated with increased incar-
ceration for violent crimes among nonwhites from 1986-1991, they are never statistically
signicant.23
6.6 Robustness Checks Using Lotteries for Unaected Cohorts
One possible concern with our main estimation strategy is that, despite being random, the
rst numbers drawn (which led to eligibility) may have included a disproportionate number
of birth dates that we would expect to be associated with higher rates of crime even if no
one was called to serve in the military. For example, this could occur if men born on dates
with the earliest lottery numbers tended to come from disadvantaged backgrounds.
To verify that this type of phenomenon is not driving our results, we apply each of
the three lotteries to adjacent cohorts that the given lottery did not aect and conduct
the analysis as before.24 For example, we test the 1969 draft that applied to the 1944{1950
cohorts by matching the 1969 lottery numbers to the birth dates in the 1943 and 1951 cohorts
and testing for eects. Since the 1969 lottery did not actually apply to these cohorts, we
should not nd signicant eects unless the 1969 lottery suered from the potential problem
described above. We test each lottery using the two adjacent cohorts for whom the robustness
check is most likely valid. To improve precision, we also estimate the eects using all of the
unaected cohorts that our data sets allow us to cover, ranging from 1942{1959.25
These results (focusing on violent crimes) are presented in Table 8. The odd-numbered
23Note that this data is less useful for corroborating our results for whites because the NCRP does not
begin tracking admissions until 1983, whereas the eects for whites manifest as early as 1979.
24The robustness checks presented in this section focus on whites but the results are qualitatively similar
for nonwhites.
25In particular, the Vital Statistics of the United States do not provides birth data by month, gender, and
race for earlier or later cohorts.
18columns test each lottery using all of its unaected cohorts and the even-numbered columns
test each lottery using the two adjacent unaected cohorts. Consistent with random as-
signment, the estimates are neither uniformly positive nor uniformly negative and none are
statistically signicant.
A second possible concern with our empirical strategy relates to the validity of the ex-
clusion restriction for the TSIV estimates. In particular, one might be concerned that draft-
eligible men may have engaged in draft avoidance behaviors that could aect their probability
of incarceration.26 Using hypothetical APNs taken from the 1969, 1970, and 1971 drawings,
we test for this possibility by considering possible eects on men who were assigned low
draft lottery numbers in the four non-binding lotteries taking place in 1972{1975. Since
these lottery numbers were assigned but their results were not used to induct men into the
military, we expect to see no link between low lottery numbers and violent crime unless
lottery numbers aected criminality through mechanisms besides military service. Table 9
shows these results for violent crime among those born 1953{1956. Again, the results are
not consistently positive or negative and none are statistically signicant.27
7 Discussion and Conclusion
Like Lochner and Morreti (2004), our results highlight the importance of \nurture" beyond an
individual's immediate circumstances. Also like Lochner and Morreti, we nd especially large
eects on violence. We nd robust evidence that military service increases the probability
of incarceration for violent crimes among whites, with point estimates suggesting an impact
26Of particular concern, although the evidence is based on a very small sample, Kuziemko (2008) presents
suggestive evidence that men with low lottery numbers may have engaged in delinquent behaviors to avoid
being drafted.
27As another robustness check, we have considered the interaction between incarceration for a violent
crime and non-Army military service as an outcome. Since nearly all drafted men served in the Army, we
should not nd signicant eects on this outcome. Indeed, we nd draft eligibility signicantly raises the
probability of being a violent oender and an army veteran and has no eect on being a violent oender and
a veteran from another branch of service.
19of 0.27 percentage points.28 Perhaps not surprisingly, our estimates suggest that military
service has a much greater impact on criminal behavior than Lochner and Morreti nd for
education. To put the relative magnitudes into context, our estimates suggest that military
service is equivalent a twelve year reduction in schooling for whites.29
While our identication strategy only allows us to estimate the eects of military service
during the Vietnam era, particular features of the today's military suggest that our results
may be relevant today. For example, the military continues the use of highly realistic training
simulations, a legacy of late-1960s eorts to desensitize soldiers to engaging with enemy
combatants. In addition, the 14 to 25 percent rates of posttraumatic stress disorder for
veterans of Iraq and Afganistan are quite similar to the 18 to 20 percent rates for those who
served in the Vietnam War. 30
At the same time, today's military readily acknowledges that soldiers often struggle with
the transition to civilian life and that skills that promote success in combat can translate into
unhealthy behaviors at home. For this reason, each branch of the military has programs to
help ease the transition. Although research highlights some promising results for the average
soldier (Castro et al. 2006; Adler et al. 2009), recent evidence raises serious concerns about
the treatment of servicemen with the most-severe mental problems (Stahl 2009).31 Coupled
with this mixed evidence on the ecacy of the treatment of soldiers at risk of mental health
problems, our results, which demonstrate grave consequences of military service, highlight
28These ndings are broadly consistent with much of the prior literature that has considered military
service as a determinant of violent behavior.
29This comparison is solely meant for illustrative purposes. It is likely that there are nonlinearities in the
eect of education on crime that Moretti and Lochner (2004) are unable to identify with their empirical
strategy.
30These statistics are taken from a 2008 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services report.
31In response to a survey from the Warrior Transition Unit at Fort Hood, where physically and mentally
wounded soldiers are sent to heal, 41 percent of commanding ocers thought more than half of soldiers
claiming to have symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder were faking or exaggerating versus 11 percent
of nurse case managers. Both ocers and nurses agreed that soldiers with behavioral health problems were
over-medicated|nearly 50 percent in each group responded that they were \extremely condent" (10 on a
scale of 1{10) that these soldiers were prescribed too many pain killers.
20the need for further research in this area.
Our results also have at least one additional important policy implication for the mili-
tary. In particular, our results reveal social costs of military service that are not directly
accounted for in military policy. Based on our more robust estimates that focus on whites, a
conservative back of the envelope calculation similar to Lochner and Morreti (2004) suggests
that increasing the number of soldiers in the Army by 10,000 entails a $30.5 million cost in
terms of increased violent crimes.32 If these costs are not considered, the optimal size of the
military and the optimal number of military endeavors will both be overstated.
Finally, our results have important implications for the legal system, which has 23 recently
established pilot courts that try only cases in which the oender is a veteran.33 Possibly out
of some sense of society's responsibility for their behavior, these courts focus on rehabilitation
and treatment programs instead of incarceration. In 2008, senators Kerry and Murkowski
introduced legislation to extend the program nationally. The existence of this special court
system implicitly creates a separate legal class for veterans and tacitly acknowledges that
military service can have negative consequences that manifest in criminal behavior once ser-
vicemen return home. But these courts exclude the violent oenders. Our analysis suggests
that these are the oenses for which military service is most clearly responsible.
32The U.S. Army currently has more than one million troops. This calculation is based on an estimated
impact of military service on incarceration for murder of 0.090 percentage points, an estimated impact on sex
crimes of 0.015 percentage points, and the remaining overall eect on violent crimes (0.27 percentage points)
being apportioned to robbery and assault. These imprecise estimates that are further stratied are available
upon request. This estimate is based only on costs to victims and incarceration costs and assuming that
all crimes lead to incarceration. Costs reported in Lochner and Morreti (2004) are $3,024,359 for murder,
$89,221 for rape, and approximately $9,500 for robbery and assault.
33Details on these courts can be found at the Veterans Treatment Court Clearinghouse which is hosted by
the National Association of Drug Court Professionals.
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25Figure 1
White Incarceration Rates (Per 10,000) by Draft Eligibility and Birth Cohort
Panel A: Overall Incarceration Rates
Panel B: Incarceration Rates for Violent Crimes
Notes: Incarceration data is from the 1979, 1986, and 1991 Surveys of Inmates in
State and Federal Correctional Facilities and birth data is from Vital Statistics
of the United States. All drafted cohorts include birth years ranging from 1944
to 1953.
26Table 1
Angrist and Chen's (2008) Estimated Eects of Draft Eligibility on Military Service
Cohorts 1948{1952 1950{1952 1950 1951 1952
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Whites
Draft-eligibility eect 0.112*** 0.145*** 0.133*** 0.138*** 0.168***
(0.0010) (0.0013) (.0024) (.0023) (.0022)
Panel B: Nonwhites
Draft-eligibility eect 0.072*** 0.094*** 0.090*** 0.096*** 0.096***
(0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0063)
Notes: Angrist and Chen (2008) controlled for year, state, and month of birth and
used sampling weights in calculating these estimates. Their sample was based
on restricted use data from the U.S. Census. While we are unable to control
for state of birth in estimates that use our data, random assignment of lottery
numbers implies that this should not lead to bias.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
27Table 2
Mean Incarceration Rates (Per 10,000) for Whites
Draft Eligible Not Draft Eligible
All Crime 54.7 55.6
Violent Crime 21.6 19.1
Drug Crime 18.0 19.3
Property Crime 10.1 10.4
Public Order Crime 7.1 8.2
Notes: Observations are at the exact day of birth by survey year level. Incar-
ceration data is from the 1979, 1986, and 1991 Surveys of Inmates in State and
Federal Correctional Facilities and birth data is from the Vital Statistics of the
United States.
28Table 3
Estimated Eects of Draft Eligibility and Military Service on Incarceration
for Any Crime for Whites
Cohorts All 1948{1952 1950{1952
(1) (2) (3)
Estimated eect of eligibility per 10,000 -0.301 0.461 4.690
(2.105) (2.818) (3.579)
% Impact -0.5 0.8 7.7
TSIV estimated of eect of service | 0.0004 0.0032
(0.0025) (0.0025)
Observations 9,864 5,481 3,288
Notes: Observations are at the exact day of birth by survey year level. Incar-
ceration data is from the 1979, 1986, and 1991 Surveys of Inmates in State and
Federal Correctional Facilities and birth data is from the Vital Statistics of the
United States. All specications include month-by-year of birth xed eects and
survey year xed eects and weight by the number of individuals represented by
the cell. All drafted cohorts include birth years ranging from 1944 to 1952. Es-
timated standard errors, clustered on lottery number, are shown in parentheses.
The two sample instrumental variables (TSIV) estimates of the eect of military
service on incarceration use the rst stage estimates shown in Table 1.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
29Table 4
Estimated Eects of Draft Eligibility and Military Service on Incarceration
for Violent Crimes for Whites
Cohorts All 1948{1952 1950{1952
(1) (2) (3)
Estimated eect of eligibility per 10,000 2.562** 3.015* 4.038*
(1.133) (1.586) (2.062)
% Impact 13.5 14.5 19.1
TSIV estimated of eect of service | 0.0027* 0.0028*
(0.0014) (0.0014)
Observations 9,864 5,481 3,288
Notes: See Table 3.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Robustness Check Applying Lotteries to Unaected Cohorts
Estimated Eects of Draft Eligibility and Military Service Incarceration for Violent Crimes
Cohort's Lottery Used 1944{1950 1951 1952
Cohort's In Analysis 1942, 1943 1943, 1951 1942{1950 1950, 1952 1942{1951 1951, 1953
1951{1959 1952{1959 1953{1959
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Est. eect of eligibility per 10,000 -1.173 1.080 0.010 2.646 0.802 2.334
(1.082) (2.070) (0.832) (2.643) (0.987) (2.569)
% Impact -4.7 6.6 0.0 11.4 3.6 11.7
Observations 12,051 2,190 18,627 2,193 18,624 2,190
Notes: See Table 3. Estimates use only observations for whites.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
34Table 9
Robustness Check Using Nonbinding Lotteries for 1953-56 Birth Cohorts
Estimated Eects of Draft Eligibility and Military Service Incarceration for Violent Crimes
Highest APN Applied 95 125 195
(1) (2) (3)
Estimated eect of eligibility per 10,000 -0.179 -2.206 0.843
(1.958) (1.818) (1.716)
% Impact -0.7 -8.3 3.3
Observations 4,383 4,383 4,383
Notes: See Table 3. Estimates use only observations for whites.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
35Appendix 1: Additional Figures and Tables
Figure A1













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Appendix 2: Alternative Strategies for Calculating Births
per Day
As we describe in the main text, in order to calculate incarceration rates for exact dates
of birth, we must construct the number of births per day based on the Vital Statistics of
the United States, which only reports births per month for the cohorts we consider. The
results we show throughout the paper apportion the number of births in each month evenly
across the days in each month. In this section, we describe two alternative strategies that
give nearly identical results. The rst alternative that we have considered accounts for
diering birth patterns across weekdays and weekends. It has been documented that in
recent periods more cesarean sections and birth inductions take place on each weekday than
on each weekend day (Dickert-Conlin and Chandra 1999), possibly because doctors want to
schedule these procedures on days when the hospital is more heavily staed. To account for
this weekday-weekend variation, we match each day of the week in the data for our cohorts
of interest to the same day of the week in the 1969 data for which we have daily birth counts.
The percentage of births in the month that occurred on that day in the later data is used
to apportion the total monthly births in the earlier data across days. Consider January
1st, 1950 which was a Sunday. The rst Sunday in 1969 was January 5th. In 1969 2.7%
of January births occurred on the rst Sunday. So 2.7% of the births in January 1950 are
assigned to January 1st, 1950. This procedure is repeated for each day and the percentages
of birth in each month are normalized to 100. For some years the days in the rst or last
week of the year are matched forward or backward to nd a match. For instance, in 1944 the
53rd week contains a Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. In 1969 the 53rd week only contains a
Tuesday and a Wednesday. So for 1944 the last three days are assigned the birth percentages
on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday that occurred in the 52nd week instead of the 53rd. Another
alternative strategy we have considered recognizes that birth technology has changed over
38the 25 years that elapse between the rst year of interest and 1969 (the rst year for which
we have births at the day level, as used in the rst alternative strategy above). We can
obtain an estimate of the weekend eect that uses only data from the period of interest by
exploiting the dierent number of weekend days that fall on a given month across years. We
estimate:
Birthsym =   WeekendDaysym + vy + m + ym: (6)
This is a regression of the number of births in each month-year on the number of Saturdays
and Sundays in the month with xed eects for month and year. The coecient  gives the
decrease in the number of births when a month has one additional weekend day. January
1948 had one more Sunday than January 1947. The number of white births in January
1948 was less than the number of white births in January 1947. Some of the decrease in
the number of births in January 1948 was due to the weekend eect. Since January had 31
days in both years, some of the decrease in births was due to births being shifted from the
extra weekend day at the end of the month into February. The number of births in each
month are then apportioned out where each weekend day gets a fewer number of births than
each weekday. All weekdays are treated alike and all weekend days are treated alike. The
advantage of this strategy is that it does not impose the weekend eect from a later era
on the monthly birth data from 25 years earlier. We have also explored a variation of this
strategy where the weekend eect is a percentage change in the total monthly births rather
than a xed decrease in the number of births. These strategies likely improve the accuracy
of our measures of births per day and, hence, the accuracy of our measures of incarceration
rates. However, because they do not change the results, we adopt the simpler and more
transparent method described in the main text.
39